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Abstract Literature surrounding the accuracy of deception
detection has produced inconsistent findings, and the majority
of investigations have been based upon low-stakes lies.
Although recent research has suggested that high-stakes situ-
ations may produce reliable cues to deception, it remains un-
clear whether knowledge of these cues actually improves the
detection of lies. In an online experiment, we assessed partic-
ipant’s ability to detect lies in 22 public appeals for help with
missing or murdered relatives (N = 196). Participants were
randomly allocated to either the cue condition (presented with
previously identified cues to deception) or no cue condition
(instructed to make judgement on instinct), before being pre-
sented with the video footage. Participants were asked to in-
dicate whether the appealer is lying or telling the truth, how
confident they are in their judgement and if they were familiar
with the case. At the end of the experiment, participants wrote
qualitative responses on the cues that they used during lie
detection. Although cue knowledge and confidence did not
significantly predict accuracy scores, there was a positive re-
lationship between accuracy and age. Participants who used
emotion-based cues were significantly better at detecting de-
ception. The findings are discussed with reference to the ex-
istence of reliable cues.
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Introduction
Through recent research on high-stakes lies, certain cues have
emerged that appear to be significantly more prevalent in de-
ceptive rather than honest communications, and some of these
cues differ remarkably between high-stakes and low-stakes
settings. For example, gaze aversion and head movements
have been identified as cues in high-stakes televised appeals
(Wright Whelan et al. 2014), whereas in low-stakes laboratory
studies, these cues are not reliable (DePaulo et al. 2003). It is
possible that when the stakes are high (e.g. risking prosecution
for a murder), the behaviour of liars is significantly different to
low-stakes lie situations. This could be due to a large number
of moderator variables (Sporer and Schwandt 2007), includ-
ing preparation, differences in emotional processes,
interviewing techniques and motivation. Despite earlier re-
search suggesting that people perform at chance levels when
detecting lies (Bond and DePaulo 2006), more recent research
on high-stakes lies generally supports the proposition that
people are able to achieve above chance accuracy at deception
detection (e.g. Lyons et al. 2013). Such findings imply that
there are reliable cues to deception, potentially typical to high-
stakes lies, which some individuals can utilise in their
judgement.
Besides gaze aversion and head shaking (Wright Whelan
et al. 2014), other cues to high-stakes lies have been identified
in recent studies. Lack of emotional authenticity (ten Brinke
and Porter 2012; Wright Whelan et al. 2015a), blink rate (ten
Brinke and Porter 2012), speech errors (Porter and ten Brinke
2010) and a number of verbal cues (McQuaid et al. 2015) have
all been found to discriminate between liars and truth tellers.
However, it is unclear whether these cues can be used in
achieving accuracy in lie detection, as the motivation to be
believed can make individuals look deceptive even when they
are being truthful (Bond and DePaulo 2006).
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There has been very little research investigating whether
asking people to consciously focus on certain cues (e.g.
Wright Whelan et al. 2014, 2015a) improves their confidence
and accuracy when detecting high-stakes lies. One exception
is a study by Shaw et al. (2013), who found a significant
increase in accuracy after a full-day training workshop.
There are however several studies in which participants have
been informed of cues before making judgements regarding
low-stakes lies (e.g. Kassin and Fong 1999). Recent meta-
analyses have suggested that all forms of deception detection
training, including the informing of indicative cues, have a
small or medium positive effect on deception detection accu-
racy (Driskell 2012; Hauch et al. 2016). Therefore, it would be
expected that informing participants about cues to high-stakes
lies would improve their ability to detect a lie.
It is possible that many studies have found only a small
effect from training because intuitive processing may play an
important part in deception detection (Albrechtsen et al. 2009;
ten Brinke et al. 2014). According to Hartwig and Bond
(2011), intuitive judgements of deception are more accurate
than an explicit knowledge of valid cues, and the major lim-
itation for accuracy is the weakness of the cues, rather than
reliance on incorrect indicators. However, this could be due to
the nature of the studies, as most research has been conducted
as laboratory experiments where the liars have little to lose if
they get caught (Hartwig and Bond 2011). If there are indeed
valid cues that may be typical only to high-stakes situations, it
is possible that when people are instructed to focus on these
cues, their accuracy increases, together with confidence in
their judgements. Previous research has found discrepancies
between confidence and accuracy (DePaulo et al. 1997), but
this could be an artefact of the laboratory experiments with
low-stakes lie stimuli. More recent research using high-stakes
situations has found a positive relationship between confi-
dence and accuracy of judgements (Honts et al. 2014;
Wright Whelan et al. 2015b). Thus, it may be that when peo-
ple are focusing on lies that have real-life implications, they
are somewhat consciously aware of their own accuracy.
Given the acknowledged need to examine forensic popula-
tions and high-stakes lies (Porter and ten Brinke, 2010), the
present study used video footage of real-life missing person
appeals, to investigate the relative contribution of cue knowl-
edge and confidence as predictors of deception detection ac-
curacy. Further, we wanted to control for participant’s age, as
previous studies have found that age may be a negative pre-
dictor of lie detection ability (Sweeney and Ceci 2014). We
predicted that participants who were given the previously
identified reliable cues (Wright Whelan et al. 2014, 2015a)
would have an increased ability to detect lies, in comparison
to participants who were relying on intuition. Further, we ex-
pected that participants who were given the cues would be
significantly more confident than participants who were mak-
ing the judgements based on their intuition. Due to scarcity
and inconsistency of findings regarding which behavioural
cues are indicative of deception, we also asked participants




An online experiment, titled Blie detection accuracy ,^ was
advertised at a university in North-West England to students
who were able to participate in exchange for course credits. In
addition, the experiment was advertised to the community via
the first author’s social networks, and on psychology research
participant websites. Participants were recruited through op-
portunity sampling and all participation was voluntary. After
removing participants who indicated they were familiar with
one or more of the cases (n = 72), the final sample consisted of
196 volunteers (males = 54; students = 178), aged between 16
and 67 years (M = 21.39, SD = 7.72). Participants were ran-
domly allocated to either the cue condition (N = 101;
males = 31; students = 90) or the no cue condition (N = 95;
males = 23; students = 88).
Materials
Video footage of 22 real-life high-stakes emotional television
appeals was selected for inclusion in the survey. These appeals
were based on real broadcasts from major television channels
in the UK, USA and Australia. In each appeal, a person plead-
ed for information surrounding the disappearance or murder
of an individual. Appeals were not considered for inclusion if
they were recent or high profile in the UK or if the case had
not been solved. In half of the cases (11 video clips), the
person making the appeal was honest; he or she was not in-
volved in the death or disappearance of the individual.
However, in the other half (11 video clips), the person making
the appeal was involved in the death or disappearance and was
therefore deceptive in the clip. In all these cases, the appealer
was convicted in a criminal court for their involvement, and in
the cases classified as honest, another person was convicted of
the death or the missing individual was found. Appealers were
only classified as either deceptive or honest if there was over-
whelming evidence to support the conclusion of the case
(criteria set out by Vrij and Mann 2001; ten Brinke and
Porter 2012). Each appeal was reviewed and clips were cut
appropriately; videos had duration between 8 and 38 s.
Procedure
After being presented with an online information sheet, online
consent and demographic information, participants were
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randomly allocated to one of two conditions. All of the par-
ticipants were given the following instructions: BYou will be
shown a series of video clips of people talking about missing
or murdered individuals. In some of the clips, the person who
is interviewed has been personally involved with the disap-
pearance or murder, therefore is lying. In the other clips, the
person being interviewed is being truthful. Please watch the
clips carefully, and try to judge whether the person is telling
the truth, or whether they are lying^. In the Bno cue^ condi-
tion, these instructions were followed by the statement BTry to
use your instinct when making your judgement^. In the Bcue^
condition, participants were told that BPrevious studies have
found that when people are telling lies in high-stakes situa-
tions (i.e., missing persons appeals), they often (although not
always) (1) avert their gaze, and don’t look directly into the
camera (2) Shake their head and (3) fake their emotions, in-
cluding having tears that are forced rather than natural^.
All other content of the survey was the same for partici-
pants in both conditions, including the video footage of the
appeals (11 truthful and 11 deceptive) in a randomised order
for lies and truths. After viewing each clip, participants were
asked to indicate whether the person appealing was lying or
telling the truth, then rate how confident they were with this
answer using a six-point Likert scale (ranging from Bnot con-
fident at all^ to Bextremely confident^). Participants were also
asked whether they were familiar with each case featuring in
the footage. At the end of the survey, participants were asked
to qualitatively report what behaviours they focused on when
judging the clips before being thanked and presented with a
full debrief.
Data Analysis
To estimate deception detection accuracy, signal detection the-
ory (Higham et al. 2009; Macmillan and Creelman 2005) was
used to calculate a hit rate and a false alarm rate for each
participant. The hit rate expressed the probability of correctly
identifying a liar, whereas the false alarm rate was the proba-
bility of a non-liar being wrongly identified as a liar. The
Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) correction was applied to these
rates to compute a non-bias measure of lie detection accuracy
(d) to be used in the analysis.
Qualitative responses in which participants detailed the be-
haviours they focused upon when detecting lies were initially
analysed using the inductive thematic analysis procedure
(Braun and Clarke 2006). Responses were carefully and thor-
oughly read to search for patterns, and then, each unit of text
was grouped into categories. Codes for each category were
created and the entire content of the data set was coded. The
analysis identified six key factors taken into account when
detecting deception: emotion, body language, the spoken ac-
count, head movement, eye movement and the participant’s
personal instinct.
Results
Descriptive statistics and differences between the cue condi-
tions for accuracy (d), confidence and age are reported in
Table 1. An independent samples t test revealed no significant
difference between the cue condition and the no cue condition
for deception detection accuracy (d) or confidence ratings.
However, despite random allocation, results show that age
significantly differed between the cue conditions.
A simultaneous linear regression analysis was conducted to
analyse the effect of cue condition, confidence and age on
deception detection accuracy (d). Age emerged as the only
significant predictor (b = 0.14, t = 1.94, p = 0.05), indicating
that as age increased, accuracy increased also. None of the
other predictors were significant (p > 0. 34).
For the qualitative responses, descriptive statistics and dif-
ferences in accuracy scores (d) between participants reporting
use and participants not reporting use for each cue type are
reported in Table 2. An independent samples t test was carried
out on each cue type to compare deception detection accuracy
(d) between those using the cue and those not using the cue.
Participants who reported using emotion-based cues were sig-
nificantly better at detecting deception (d) than participants
who did not report using emotion-based cues; however, no
significant differences were found for any other cue type
(see Table 2). In order to check whether participants’ accuracy
was based on the utilisation of emotion cues after being
instructed to do so in the cue condition, we conducted a 2
(emotion cues used/not used) × 2 (cue condition/no cue con-
dition) between participants’ ANOVA, where the d prime was
entered as the dependent variable. The interaction between the
cue condition and the cue utilisation was not significant
(F(1192) = 0.14, p = 0.72), indicating that knowing that emo-
tion cues may be relevant to accuracy did not lead to a higher
accuracy via self-reported utilisation of these cues.
Discussion
The present study contributes to the growing body of research
examining deception detection in real-life and high-stakes sit-
uations and may have implications for the understanding of lie
detection in a forensic context. In particular, the findings raise
questions about the use of behavioural cues to determine
whether an individual is lying or telling the truth. There were
no differences in deception detection accuracy between the
participants informed of cues to deception and the participants
who were told to make judgements based on instinct. Further,
we found that confidence in deception detection did not relate
to accuracy, in line with DePaulo et al. (1997), but contrary to
findings reported byWright Whelan et al. (2015b). A positive
relationship was found between age and deception detection
accuracy, which contradicts research by Sweeney and Ceci
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(2014) that found the older the individual, the worse the ability
to detect lies. Furthermore, overall reported cue usage was not
associated with deception detection accuracy; however, par-
ticipants who used emotion-based cues were better at decep-
tion detection than participants that did not.
Although the study relied upon prior research that has iden-
tified cues to deception (Wright Whelan et al. 2014, 2015a),
what constitutes these cues remains highly disputed within the
literature, and therefore, it is plausible that they may not indi-
cate deception. Due to varying sound quality and speech con-
tent of the clips, we were unable to ask participants to focus on
verbal cues that have previously been linked to deception.
Research has identified speech rates and vagueness (Porter
and ten Brinke 2010), as well as word usage (McQuaid et al.
2015) as potential indicators. Additionally, in an attempt to
create a feasible task for untrained participants, only a limited
number of cues identified in the literature were used in the
study. It is possible that successful lie detection relies on mul-
tiple cues using verbal and non-verbal channels and that our
participants were not successful in the cue condition because
they were only asked to focus on three non-verbal indicators.
The limited length of clips (8–38 s) should also be considered,
as it may be argued that this may not be enough footage to
generate a cautious decision. Though there are clear experi-
mental limitations, this was outweighed by the need to
replicate high-stakes environments, which is unlikely to be
possible in a laboratory setting.
Our results suggested neither confidence nor accuracy was
related to using intuition or cues when judging the veracity of
the appeals. It is possible that despite receiving instructions to
use previously identified cues, participants in the cue condi-
tion also had the contribution of intuitions inaccessible to the
conscious mind (Hartwig and Bond 2011). Equally, partici-
pants in the no cue condition may have held stereotypical
beliefs regarding which cues were indicative of deception
and therefore utilised similar cues to those provided in the
cue condition, when making judgements regarding deception.
This may explain why no difference in accuracy was found
between the two cue conditions. Interestingly, qualitative re-
sponses in our study indicated that individuals who used emo-
tions as a cue performed better, but this was not dependent on
the experimental condition they were in. Faked sadness and
leaking of happiness have been identified as cues in high-
stakes lies (ten Brinke and Porter 2012). In our study, individ-
uals who noted faked emotions as an important cue also
reached higher accuracy, suggesting that people who are good
at detecting lies may intuitively concentrate on the veracity of
emotions. Therefore, as highlighted by Wright Whelan et al.
(2015a), emotional authenticity may be beneficial to those
needing to discriminate between truth and lies, for example
in a forensic setting.
Contrary to Sweeney and Ceci (2014), we found that de-
ception detection accuracy increased with age. One possible
explanation for this result is linked to previous findings which
indicate that in children, older subjects show a more cynical
judgement bias (DePaulo et al. 1982). As people get older,
there appears to be an increased awareness surrounding the
notion that people’s overt expressions do not always resemble
internal feelings. Additionally, with age comes more opportu-
nity to encounter deception, which may explain why the abil-
ity to detect deception improved with age. This would suggest
that experience improves deception detection, something that
should be investigated more in future studies. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that as a large proportion of the sample were
students, only a few participants fell into the over 50 age
bracket and no participants were aged 68 or above.
Therefore, further research using a sample with a wider age
range is required.
In conclusion, we provide the first evidence to suggest that
instructing people to focus on previously identified non-verbal
cues to high-stakes lies is not associated with accuracy or
confidence in deception detection ability. However, irrespec-
tive of being instructed to use intuition or cues, people who
qualitatively reported that emotions are an important in lie
detection performed better than people who did not mention
emotions. It is possible that the ingredient of a good lie detec-
tor is the ability to identify truthful and feigned emotions. This
may be something that is based on intuition, as even accurate
Table 2 Descriptive statistics and t tests for accuracy (d) by self-
reported usage of cue type
Mean (±SD) t
Cues used Cues not used
Emotion 0.43 (0.55) 0.24 (0.55) 2.35*
Body language 0.38 (0.59) 0.32 (0.53) 0.68
Spoken account 0.34 (0.56) 0.35 (0.54) −0.17
Head movement 0.35 (0.49) 0.35 (0.56) 0.06
Eye movement 0.35 (0.60) 0.33 (0.48) 0.25
Instinct 0.12 (0.51) 0.35 (0.55) −0.81
*p < .05; **p < .01
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and t tests for accuracy (d), confidence
and age by the cue condition
Mean (±SD) t
Overall Cue No cue
Accuracy (d) 0.35 (0.55) 0.35 (0.54) 0.34 (0.56) 0.07
Confidence 4.04 (0.78) 4.04 (0.78) 4.03 (0.78) 0.14
Age 21.39 (7.72) 22.42 (9.73) 20.29 (4.55) 1.97**
N 196 101 95
*p < .05; **p < .01
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individuals were bad at monitoring their responses. The ability
to identify crocodile tears may not be a skill that can be taught,
although this remains to be investigated in future studies.
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